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The question whether distant simultaneity (relativized to an inertial frame) has a fac-
tual or a conventional status in special relativity has long been disputed and remains in
contention even today. At one point it appeared that Malament (1977) had settled the
issue by proving that the only non-trivial equivalence relation definable from (tempo-
rally symmetric) causal connectability is the standard simultaneity relation. Recently,
however, Sarkar and Stachel (1999) claim to have identified a suspect assumption in
the proof by defining a non-standard simultaneity relation from causal connectability.
I contend that their critique is based on a misunderstanding of the criteria for the de-
finability of a relation, a misunderstanding that Malement’s original treatment helped
to foster. There are in fact a variety of notions of definability that can be brought to
bear. They all, however, require a condition that suffices to secure Malament’s result.
The non-standard relation Sarkar and Stachel claim to be definable is not so definable,
and, I argue, their proposal to modify the notion of “causal definability” is misguided.
Finally, I address the relevance of Malament’s result to the thesis of conventionalism.
1. Introduction. In his classic paper setting out the special theory of relativity,
Einstein (1905) observed that, although the time of an event can be given by
the simultaneous reading of a clock in its immediate neighborhood, the times
of occurrence of events at different locations cannot be compared without some
further arrangement [Festsetzung] (893-4). One has at best a “time” given by
the readings of a clock at the one location and a “time” given by those of a clock
at the other. A common “time” can be defined by stipulating by definition that
the “time” it takes for light to travel from the one to the other is equal to the
“time” required for the reverse. From this follows the standard synchronization
condition that the two clocks synchronize if, upon sending a light ray from one
to the other and reflecting it back to the first, the reading on the clock at the
site of reflection exactly splits the difference between the readings on the first
clock at departure and at return (894).
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Although the rationale for making some stipulation about the one-way speed
of light as a matter of definition was lost on not a few early commentators and
textbook writers (see in particular Silberstein (1914, 93–99), Schlick (1920, 14-
17) and Cunningham (1921, 28–31)), Reichenbach (1924, 10) eventually assim-
ilated Einstein’s stipulation to the status of a convention in the sense in which
Helmholtz and Poincare´ had held that geometry is conventional. Gru¨nbaum
(1973, 342–69) understood the basis for the Einstein definition to lie in the
“fact” that the relation of causal connectability between spacetime events is
insufficient for uniquely establishing a strict temporal ordering of events, even
from the point of view of a fixed inertial frame of reference.
Malament (1977) directly challenges this alleged “fact.” According to Mala-
ment, Gru¨nbaum commits himself to the following pair of assertions (293):
(1) The relation of simultaneity relative to an inertial observer is not uniquely
definable in terms of the relation κ of causal connectability.
(2) Temporal relations are non-conventional if and only if they are so definable.
Malament observes that A. A. Robb (1914) had in effect already shown that the
relation of orthogonality on the [affine] space R4 with Minkowski inner product
is “explicitly, first order definable in terms of κ” (296), where the ordered pair
(p, q) is in the relation κ just in case the inner product of p−q with itself is non-
negative.1 Hence, one can define two events e1, e2 to be simultaneous relative
to inertial observer O if and only if for some (in fact, any) pair r, s of distinct
events on the world-line of O, the vector e2 − e1 is orthogonal to r − s. This
is extensionally equivalent to the standard Einstein synchronization condition
above. Malament goes on to show that the only other non-trivial2 equivalence
relation between events definable from k and O is the universal relation. Hence,
assuming that the relation of simultaneity for an inertial observer is a non-
trivial equivalence relation smaller than the universal relation, it follows that the
standard simulataneity relation is uniquely definable, contra (1) above. By (2),
then, it is non-conventional.
Recently, Sarkar and Stachel (1999) have challenged the validity of Mala-
ment’s result. They claim to have found another (in fact, two other) non-trivial
equivalence relations definable for O from κ. From the fact that these are
ruled out by Malament’s proof they infer that Malament imposes “an unwar-
ranted physical assumption: that any simultaneity relation must remain invari-
ant under temporal reflections.” (208), and argue that this assumption should
be relaxed. Spirtes (1981, 171–186) has also claimed that if the restriction of
invariance under temporal reflections is lifted, then non-standard simultaneity
relations are definable, in fact uncountably many.
The purpose of this note is to explain in what ways Sarkar and Stachel’s cri-
tique of Malament is misguided. The non-standard simultaneity relation they
1This assumes the sign convention (+,−,−,−).
2In the sense that at least some point on O is equivalent to at least one point not on O.
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claim to be able to define for O from κ is in fact not so definable. Furthermore,
Malament’s result does not rely on “physical assumptions” either warranted or
unwarranted. Unfortunately, the issue is somewhat confused by the fact that
Malament gave an incorrect formulation of what it means for a relation to be
implicitly definable. Sarkar and Stachel assume that this formulation has the
status of a proposal and thus consider it open for criticism whether what they
call Malament’s “explication” (Sarkar and Stachel, 212) is “physically reason-
able” (215). However, just what relations are definable from what is a purely
formal, mathematical question and has nothing to do with issues of physical
adequacy. There are in fact several, distinct formal notions of definability avail-
able from mathematical logic, and it is less than clear specifically which of these
Malament had in mind. However, no matter which is adopted, his result re-
mains unaffected, since it relies on a condition strictly weaker than the one he
gives, and this weaker condition is a logical consequence of each of these no-
tions of definability. In conclusion, I shall offer a few remarks of the bearing of
Malament’s result on the issue of the conventionality of simultaneity.
2. Sarkar and Stachel on the Definability of Light Lobes. One of
the results due to Robb (1914) is that the relation of lightlike relatedness λ be-
tween events in Minkowski spacetime is definable from κ alone.3 Quite clearly
then, any relation that is definable using λ in addition is definable from κ alone.
In particular, Sarkar and Stachel claim that the relation “p and q lie on the
same half null cone with vertex e” is just so definable in virtue of the following
defining condition:
(i) p and q both lie on the light cone with vertex e, and
(ii) either p and q are not causally connectable or else there exists a signal
connecting them which does not pass through the space-like “elsewhere”
3The relation λ on R4 is the set of ordered pairs {(p, q) | (p − q) · (p − q) = 0}. The first
order formula
pκq ∧ ∃r(r 6= p ∧ r 6= q ∧ ∀s(sκp ∧ sκq → sκr))
defines λ in the structure (R4, κ). For those expert in these matters who might be put off by
the lack of complete precision in this section and the next, I offer the following remarks. (For
those not expert, the technicalities will explained in section 4.) Above I have used the notion
of definability in a structure rather than that of explicit definability in a theory. Malament’s
locution “explicitly first order definable in terms of κ (300) is ambiguous between this and the
notion of explicit (first order) definability in a theory. As will be seen later, this formula also
explicitly defines λ in T , where T can be characterized equivalently as either the deductive
closure of Robb’s axioms or the set of all sentences of the predicate language containing κ alone
that are true in (R4, κ). Note as well that, following Malament, I have systematically failed
to distinguish between ‘κ’ as a name for the predicate of this language and ‘κ’ as a symbol
for the relation assigned to that predicate as its interpretation in the structure (R4, κ). Also,
in order not to disrupt the flow of the discussion, I will, for the time being, continue to use in
the body of the text such locutions as “definable from κ” despite the ambiguity as to which
notion of definability is intended.
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of e or through e itself.
The first task is to check whether indeed these conditions can be expressed
rigorously using only κ and/or λ, something Sarkar and Stachel do not concern
themselves with. The first conjunct (i) is easily rendered by the formula:
(i’) pλe ∧ qλe.
The second conjunct (ii) requires a bit of finesse. The trouble lies with the invo-
cation of the notion of a causal signal, i.e., a continuous curve whose tangent is
never spacelike. Epistemologically (and maybe even ontologically), it certainly
makes sense to regard this notion as more primitive than the relation of causal
connectability. However, in the game that’s at the table, in which causal con-
nectability is the sole primitive, it must, rigorously speaking, be reconstructed
from that sole primitive. Actually, for the purposes at hand, it would suffice
to find a way of expressing when three events are respectively optically, or in-
ertially collinear, and when so, which of the three is between the other two.
Most of this task can be handled in the fashion of Robb via definitions of optical
line, parallel optical lines, acceleration plane, inertial line, etc. However, since
Robb took the notion of causally after to be his primitive, some additional cun-
ning is needed, particularly in handling relations of betweeness. The details are
edifying, but hardly to the point for present purposes.
The second, and main task is to asses what Sarkar and Stachel think follows
from this. What bearing does this have on Malament’s result? Sarkar and
Stachel argue as follows. Temporarily fix the parameter e and let Λ(e) be the
full light cone centered at e.
It follows that there are two such half null cones, with only e in
common, that is, Λ−(e)
⋃
Λ+(e) = Λ(e) and Λ−(e)
⋂
Λ+(e) = {e}.
Note that this distinction, once made on the null cone at any point
of spacetime, can be consistently carried by parallel transport to the
null cone at any other point of spacetime.
Thus λ can be used to define two additional simultaneity re-
lations, BackO,e and ForwO,e, relative to a time-like world line O:
two events are simultaneous relative to an event e on O if and only
if they lie on Λ−(e) [Λ+(e)]. Clearly neither relation is “vacuous” in
Malament’s (297) sense: e is simultaneous to events not on O and
not all events are simultaneous. Each is also trivially an equivalence
relation. Most importantly, each of the relations can be defined from
λ alone, since Λ−(e) [Λ+(e)] can be so defined. (Note, that since they
are definable from λ, they are also definable from κ.)
Clearly, something is amiss with Malament’s theorem. A cor-
rect mathematical result seems to be contradicted by patently good
counterexamples.
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What may be patent to them may not be so for everyone. Again, we need to
check for rigor. To begin with, there is an obvious slip, though one that is
easily correctable. Fix the parameters O and e in the definition of BackO,e.
The resulting equivalence relation has but two equivalence classes, Λ−(e) and
its complement. Hence, any event not on the past light cone of e is “BackO,e”-
simultaneous to any other event not on the back light cone of e. Clearly this is
not what is intended. The proposed simultaneity criterion should yield a one-
parameter family of equivalence relations, one for each choice of world line O.
Having fixed O, the events e on O then generate the equivalence classes [e] of the
relation defined. So, the term ‘e’ should not appear as an additional parameter
in the definiens, but at best as a variable quantified over in the definiendum.
The relation Sarkar and Stachel have in mind is in fact given by:
Sim−O(p, q) iff ∃e(e ∈ O ∧ p, q ∈ Λ−(e)).
In other words, p and q are back-light-cone simultaneous for world-line O just
in case they lie on the back light cone of some event e on O (and similarly for
the forward directed counterpart relation Sim+O).
These two relations, however, are not counterexamples; they are not defin-
able from λ and/or κ alone. The reason is that, although the relation of lying
on the same half null cone may be definable, and indeed it can be shown that
there exist exactly two half cones, neither one of these cones is itself definable.
It is an elementary fallacy to think that just because two things satisfying a
certain condition are given, one thereby succeeds in defining either one of them
merely by introducing a pair of labels. In the event that this is not completely
obvious, it may help to examine some parallel examples.
3. Two Analogues. Consider from group theory Klein’s Viergruppe, the
four-element group V with the following multiplication table, where e is the
identity element.4
e a b c
e e a b c
a a e c b
b b c e a
c c b a e
The automorphisms of V are given by all permutations of a, b, c. Although V
contains exactly three elements distinct from the identity element, a fact ob-
viously first-order expressible in the language of group theory, none of these
4Apart from the cyclic group of order four, there is up to isomorphism only one other four-
element group, a fact potentially disguised by some of its realizations. For example, Klein’s
Viergruppe is also the symmetry group of a line segment in the Euclidean plane, as well as
the product group C2 × C2, where Cn is the cyclic group of order n.
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elements is individually definable. (The language can be taken to include, be-
sides the usual logical symbols, an individual constant symbol for the identity
element and a function symbol for group multiplication.) To drive home the
general point, we can construct a tighter analogy with the light cone case (with
fixed vertex e) as follows. The entire group V will play the role of Λ(e). Next
define a relation xRy (which you are invited to read as ‘x lies on the same “lobe”
as y’) by
xRy iff ((x ◦ y = x) ∨ (x ◦ y = y)).
The relation R generates the three “lobes” {e, a}, {e, b}, {e, c}, which as a triplet
you are invited to think of as the analogue of the pair of cones with vertex e.
Note, again, that there exist exactly three “lobes” sharing the identity element
is first-order expressible.5 Now, in order for the lobe, say {e, a} to be definable,
there must exist a group-theoretic equation in one free variable which is solved
by e and a alone. However, from the fact that the automorphisms of V are the
permutations of a, b, c, it follows that if a is a solution to an equation, then so
are b and c. Hence, no individual lobe is definable. I hope this helps to make it
more compelling why it is that simply introducing labels gets one no closer to
definitions.
A second example, which matches the light lobes case in cardinality, relies
only on the topology of the real line. Let betweeness be given as the only
primitive relation on R1 and pick some distinguished point of R1, for the sake
of definiteness the base e of the natural logarithm, as the only other primitive.
Now define the relation Sexy by
Sexy iff ¬eBxy,
where zBxy is to be read “z lies between x and y.” Hence Sexy just in case x
and y lie on the same ray with end point e. Think of this binary relation as the
analogue of “p and q lie on the same half null cone with vertex e”. Obviously,
there are exactly two rays of the real line with end point e a fact expressible
even without recourse to a many sorted language or higher order quantification.6
Think of these two rays as counterparts of the two lobes of the light cone with
vertex at event e. Of course, we might introduce labels, say RAY− and RAY+
“merely to distinguish them” (Sarkar and Stachel, 213), without claiming to
know which denotes which ray or in anyway introducing an orientation on the
real line. But again, this in no way establishes that each individual ray is
5Transcribe into first order notion the following: there exist at least three elements, none
on the same lobe as another, such that any other element is on the same lobe as one of the
three.
6Consider the first-order sentence
∃x∃y(x 6= y∧x 6= e∧y 6= e∧Sexe∧Seye∧¬Sexy∧∀z(z 6= x∧z 6= y∧z 6= e→ Sezx∨Sezy)).
A first order sentence of the same form then expresses the fact that there are exactly two half
light cones at e by substituting the analogous predicate and relativizing the quantifiers to the
set of events lightlike related to e.
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definable from the betweeness relation (and e) alone. What is needed for each
is a predicate expression (involving only e and B) in one free variable satisfiable
by all and only points on the ray to be defined. As will shortly become evident,
it is provable by symmetry arguments that no such expressions exist.
In presenting these examples, I hope to have tapped intuitions about the
conditions under which a given relation or object is definable. But I do not
want the case to rest solely with that. There is a standard literature on defin-
ability that backs those intuitions. Before turning to this, it may be instructive
to consider just what does transpire in the familiar form of reasoning which pro-
ceeds: “We have shown there are exactly two things which are such-and-such.
Call them c1 and c2 respectively. It now follows that . . . .”
Let ϕ(x) be a predicate expression in one free variable x, and suppose it has
been established that there are exactly two things satisfying ϕ(x). What is the
effect of introducing arbitrary tags c1, c2 in subsequent reasoning? The upshot
of the move is to make available the following assumptions: ϕ(c1), ϕ(c2), c1 6= c2,
and finally ∀x(ϕ(x) → (x = c1 ∨ x = c2)). If one then succeeds in deriving a
sentence σ not containing either c1 or c2, then one knows that σ can be proven,
in a probably much more obtuse fashion, without the introduction of c1 and
c2 and their associated assumptions. Those of you stuck with teaching logic
term after term will recognize this as nothing other than a generalized instance
of the rule of inference called Existential Instantiation, according to which,
having shown ∃xϕ(x), one says “let us introduce a name c for an arbitrarily
selected individual satisfying ϕ(x)” and proceeds to employ the assumption
ϕ(c) in subsequent reasoning. No one, of course, thinks that one has thereby
succeeded in defining one of the entities that happens to satisfy ϕ(x).
I turn now to the standard literature on definability.
4. Notions of Definability. So far I have been somewhat sloppy with regard
to certain techinical distinctions, among them, just what notion of definability
is in play. The preceding discussion, however, is most naturally construed as
addressing the notion of definability in a structure.
Let A be a structure for a first-order language L, R an n-ary relation on
the domain of discourse of A, and s an assignment of elements of the domain of
discourse of A to the individual variables of L. Then R is said to be definable
in A just in case the following: there is a formula ϕ of L whose free individual
variables are among x1, . . . , xn such that for any s, A satisfies ϕ with s if and
only if the n-tuple < s(x1), . . . , s(xn) > is a member of R (Enderton 1972, 88).
In order to illustrate how this applies in the above examples, we need to
be slightly more precise in our notation. For the group-theoretic example, the
non-logical vocabulary contains the two-place function symbol ◦ for group com-
position and an individual constant symbol e for the group identity.7 The Vier-
7Although the group identity is definable in any model of group theory, I include e as a
primitive of the language for expository purposes.
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gruppe V, as a structure for this language, consists of the set V = {eV, a, b, c}
together with the binary operation ◦V specified by the multiplication table.
(The horrendous notation is necessary to distinguish the identity symbol from
the identity element and the function symbol from the symbol’s interpretation.)
Since, technically speaking, the relation R is not a predicate symbol, but a
subset of V × V , the definition of R in this example should read:
< a1, a2 >∈ R iff V |= ((x ◦ y = x) ∨ (x ◦ y = y)) [a1, a2],
where V |= ϕ(x, y)[a1, a2] means that V satisfies ϕ(x, y) with s for any assing-
ment s of elements of V to variables such that s(x) = a1 and s(y) = a2.
The question as to whether a given subset (e.g., a “lobe”) of the Viergruppe
is first order definable in the group is now just the question as to whether there
is a defining formula with one free variable. The following lemma can be used
to establish that certain subsets (or relations in general) are not definable in a
given structure.
First Automorphism Lemma. The (in general n-ary) relation R is definable
in A only if R is preserved under all automorphisms of A.
It immediately follows that none of the three “lobes” of the Viergruppe is de-
finable in the group since they are not invariant under group automorphisms.
Similarly with the two rays from the second example. Reflection through the
point e preserves betweeness on the real line, and hence is an automorphism of
that structure. But neither ray is preserved under reflections.
One might ask about higher-order definability in these examples. Fortu-
nately, it is not necessary to go into the details of the conditions for second or
higher order logic. The above automorphism lemma holds under generalization
to higher orders.
There are two other standard notions of definability, both variants of the idea
of definability in a given theory , where a theory is understood to be a deductively
closed set of sentences. Here, the distinction between a predicate symbol and its
interpretation as a relation in a given model of the theory is crucial since what
is involved is really the definition of the intension of a predicate (or function)
symbol. By the intension of an n-ary predicate in a theory, we mean a function
that assigns to each model of the theory an n-ary relation on the domain of
discourse of the model. When it is said that a given relation is definable in a
theory, what is meant is that the intension of an associated predicate symbol is
definable. It is also taken for granted that the associated predicate is part of the
vocabulary in which the theory is formulated. However, so much nit-pickiness
eventually becomes cumbersome and, despite the potential for type confusions,
it is simply said that: an n-ary relation P is explicitly definable in theory T
if and only if in the language of T there exists a formula θ(x1, . . . , xn), with
variables x1, . . . , xn free but in which P does not occur, such that the sentence
∀x1 . . .∀xn(Px1 · · ·xn ↔ θ(x1, . . . , xn))
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is a theorem of T . In order to relate this to the previous notion of definability
in a structure, we adopt the following notational convention. If A is a structure
for the language of T minus the n-ary predicate P and R is an n-ary relation on
the domain of discourse of A, then (A, R) is a structure for the full language of
T in which R is the extension of P . The following is not difficult to prove: if P
is explicitly definable in T , then the relation R is definable in A for any model
(A, R) of T . In fact, the open formula θ(x1, . . . , xn) that explicitly defines P
in T defines R in A. An immediate consequence is a corollary to the above
automorphism lemma.
Second Automorphism Lemma. P is explicitly definable in theory T only
if for each model (A, R) of T the extension R of P is preserved under
automorphisms of A.
The other standard notion of definability in a theory is that of implicit
definability.8 Using the above notation, P is said to be implicitly definable in
T just in case if (A, R) and (A, R′) are any two models of T , then R = R′. A
result due to Beth is that for first order logic P is implicitly definable in T if
and only if P is explicitly definable in T . For higher order logics only the “if”
direction of the biconditional holds generally. Nonetheless, a direct and general
connection between implicit definability and model automorphism is available,
so general in fact that it applies directly to classes of structures without the
intermediary of deductively closed sets of sentences if we replace the models of
T with elements of a class K of structures in the characterization of implicit
definability.
Third Automorphism Lemma. If P is implicitly definable in K and K is
closed under isomorphism, then the extension R of P in any member
(A, R) of K is preserved under automorphisms of A.
The proof is rather immediate. Let (A, R) be a member of K and φ an automor-
phism of A. Letting φ act on (A, R) yields the isomorphic structure (φ∗A, φ∗R),
which is also a member of K if K is closed under isomorphism. However, since
φ is an automorphism of A, (φ ∗A, φ ∗R) = (A, φ ∗R). Thus, if P is implicitly
definable in K, (A, φ ∗R) = (A, R).
5. Definable Relations in Minkowski Spacetime. The punch line is now
this. No matter what notion of definability is in question, the preservation of
a relation under automorphisms of the structure or structures in question is a
necessary condition for the definability of the relation. In the case of Minkowski
spacetime, these automorphisms include temporal reflections and thus render
futile any attempt to define an individual half cone in the absence of a temporal
8The notion of implicit definability dealt with here should not be confused with that in the
writings of Schlick and Reichenbach on the foundations of mathematics inspired by Hilbert’s
axiomatization of geometry.
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orientation. A fortiori the proposed simultaneity relation Sim−O (or Sim
+
O) is
not definable “in terms of κ (and O) alone” whether this is parsed as meaning
definable in the structure (R4, κ,O), or as implicitly definable in the class of
structures isomorphic to (R4, κ,O, Sim−O), or as explicitly definable in the set
of first or any higher order sentences true in (R4, κ,O, Sim−O).
So, it might be asked, why not simply provide Minkowski spacetime with a
temporal orientation at the outset? After all, Robb took a (temporally) asym-
metric causal connectability relation as his primitive, and CP violation in weak
interactions certainly suggests that fundamental laws will not be time-reversal
invariant. This is what Sarkar and Stachel do in effect by proposing an alter-
native “definition” of definability. It is unclear, though, what they think is the
upshot of this move.
Part of the difficulty stems from a bit of terminology that slips in innocently
towards the beginning of their paper, but is quickly perverted into an expression
that is either pleonastic or pernicious. In order to talk about those mappings
of R4 to itself that preserve the relation of causal connectability, Malament
introduces the term of art “causal automorphism” (297). Sarkar and Stachel
describe Malament as “explicat[ing] the notion of ‘causally definable’ ” (212).
As far as I have been able to determine, the latter expression never occurs
in Malament’s paper. Nonetheless, it could serve as reasonable shorthand for
“definable from κ.” However, within the span of a paragraph Sarkar and Stachel
introduce the further locution “causally definable from κ and O,” which appears
time and again in what follows without further elucidation. As a substitute for
“causal automophism” in the sense just explained, this is pleonistic — “causally
definable from O” suffices. If some other reading is intended, it is pernicious —
for then there is no precedent whatsoever for what it might mean.
No doubt Malament can be accused of having invited confusion by misstat-
ing the condition for definability in Minkowski spacetime. He writes that a
relation is “implicitly definable from κ” IF and only if it is preserved under
all causal automorphisms (297).9 This led Spirtes (1981), on the assumption
that preservation under causal automorphisms is sufficient for definability, to
the conclusion that in a temporally oriented Minkowski spacetime there are
uncountably many non-standard simultaneity relations definable from κ and
the temporal orientation.10 Malament’s proof , it should be stressed, requires
only the “only if” direction. Inclusion of the “if” direction yields a criterion
far too promiscuous to of general service. That is, no further interesting sense
of “definability” is to be had with the criterion: R is definable in structure
A iff R is invariant under all automorphisms of A. To see this, consider the
standard model of arithmetic. It has no non-trivial automorphisms. Hence,
it follows from the criterion that any arithmetic relation is definable, a conse-
quence that certainly begs the question in what sense one would at all want to
9Emphasis mine.
10As far as I am aware, the backward and forward light cone relations are the only two
additional equivalence relations definable in a temporally oriented Minkowski spacetime.
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speak of“definability.”
To sum up, Sarkar and Stachel’s proposal to redefine the notion “relation
R is causally definable from κ and O” is doubly misguided. First, we have no
idea what qualification the term “causally” is supposed to add. Second, as an
instance of the suggestion to formulate some alternative notion of definability,
it falls prey to the sorts of worries just raised in connection with arithmetic.
6. Conclusion. The validity of Malament’s result remains unaffected by the
considerations and objections raised by Stachel and Sarkar. Despite what they
say, the only assumption Malament requires is that the relation in question be
a non-trivial equivalence relation strictly smaller than the universal relation.
As to the relevance of Malament’s result for the issue of the conventionality
of distant simultaneity in special relativity, there remain a number of questions.
One is whether simultaneity must be an equivalence relation. Both Redhead
(1993, 114) and Gru¨nbaum (private communication) have suggested it need not
be assumed to be. But this begs two confusions. First, if the support for this
move comes from the fact that “topological” simultaneity is not transitive, then
it rests on conflating simultaneity (full stop) with simultaneity relative to an
inertial observer. That the latter should be an equivalence relation is no more
than the requirement that the inertial observer have a criterion (conventional or
otherwise) for assigning a time coordinate to each event of spacetime. Second,
that simultaneity relative to an inertial observer is an equivalence relation does
not entail that the criterion used is independent of the “position” of the inertial
observer and hence generalizes immediately to a criterion for simultaneity with
respect to the inertial frame of all co-moving observers. If by chance it does, then
the criterion of synchronization can be said to be (symmetric and) transitive
among all clocks stationed at various “points” in the inertial frame.11 But
Malament’s result does not presuppose this stronger requirement.
Another question is whether the conventionalist is committed to assertion (2)
above, i.e., that temporal relations are non-conventional if and only if they are
uniquely definable from causal connectibility. Here it should be noted that
in general there are perhaps a half dozen distinct forms of conventionalism
(Rynasiewicz, 1999). So, whether or not the conventionalist is committed to (2)
does not admit a short answer.12
The most serious question, however, is this. Described as neutrally as possi-
ble, what Malament establishes is that the only (interesting) equivalence relation
definable from κ and O is that of lying on the same hypersurface spacetime-
orthogonal to O. Now, as silly or contentious as it may sound, we should ask,
11See Reichenbach 1958, 168: “One should not confuse . . . ‘transitivity of simultaneity’ with
‘transitivity of simultaneity according to the same rule of synchronization’.” Emphasis in the
original.
12In private communication, Gru¨nbaum denies that he commits himself to (2).
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what does spacetime orthogonality have to do physically with simultaneity? The
force of the question is more easily recognized if reframed as follows. Suppose an
inertial observer emits a light pulse in all directions. Consider the intersection
of the resulting light cone with some subsequent hypersurface orthogonal to the
observer. Does causal connectibility (plus O if you like) completely determine
the spatial geometry of the light pulse on that hypersurface in the absence of
some stipulation as to the one-way velocity of light? If not (and I urge you to
think not), then relative simultaneity does involve a conventional component
corresponding to a degree of freedom in choosing a (3+1)-dimensional represen-
tation of an intrinsically four-dimensional geometry.
Acknowledgments. I would like to thank John Earman, Domenico Giulini,
and Adolf Gru¨nbaum for comments on earlier drafts of this essay.
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